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With regard to the presentment of English and French ethical philosophy, Professor Jodl's work, it is claimed, is the first historical exposition in the German language of this special department of thought in its connection with the universal intellectual progress of these two countries. His analysis of Bentham and Mill is very accurate and full.

Professor Jodl exhibits an extensive acquaintance with English philosophical literature; indeed, he has even discovered the little book known as "Kant's Ethics," by Dr. Noah Porter, whom he calls the "Nestor" of American philosophy.

Unity of execution, and the skilful employment of historical perspective in dealing with the various phases of ethical thought, may be characterised as prominent merits of Professor Jodl's performance. In the books of its class it stands unique.

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ΕΘΙΚΗ. Eine Darstellung der ethischen Principien und deren Anwendung auf besondere Lebensverhältnisse. By Dr. *Harald Höffding*, Professor an der Universität zu Kopenhagen. Unter Mitwirkung des Verfassers aus dem Dänischen übersetzt von F. Benedixen. Leipsic: 1888.

Harald Höffding, Professor at the University of Copenhagen, is a representative thinker among ethical scholars. Unhesitatingly he takes his stand upon the real facts of life and attempts to construct a system of ethics which shall be a science among the other sciences. Professor Höffding says in his preface:

"If we see the snow-covered peaks of a mountain range from a far distance, they seem to hover in the air. Not until we approach do we discover plainly that they rest upon solid ground. It is the same with ethical principles. In the first enthusiasm one imagines that a place should be assigned to them above the reality of nature and life. On further reflection and after a longer experience, which must perhaps be dearly bought, we discover that the ethical principles can regulate late life only if they have really proceeded from life."

Professor Höffding is in a certain sense a utilitarian. The influence of utilitarian systems upon his mode of thought can be traced throughout the whole work, and it is this influence perhaps to which the Danish Professor owes his positive standpoint as well as the scientific method of his procedure. Nevertheless he differs from the ordinary utilitarian school and prefers to characterise his system as an ethics of general welfare. He says:

"The so-called utilitarianism,—that ethical conception which has been founded mainly by Bentham,—has the merit of having for the first time energetically propounded the principle of welfare. Yet Bentham has detracted from his cause by proceeding from a psychological theory which considers consciousness as a sum of ideas and feelings, and dissolves society into a number of individuals. The import of pleasurable and painful feelings for the continuous and general welfare cannot be established by a mere process of calculation." (P. 37.)

Professor Höffding opens the first chapter of his work with the following sentence :

"Ethical judgments contain a valuation of human actions. . . . The criterion of the ethical valuation is the contents of ethics."

If life consisted of isolated sovereign moments, every one of them would have an equal right, and no one would be obliged to resign in favor of any other moment. No valuation, no discrimination would be required. But the life of each individual, as well as the life of society, makes up a "life-totality," and we possess a conception of this life-totality. "If the state of feeling in a single moment agrees with the conception of the life-totality, a new feeling arises which is determined by this mutual relation. . . . The ethical valuation is conditioned by this feeling." (p. 27.) Taking this ground, Professor Höffding defines good and bad in the following way :

"'Good' accordingly becomes that which preserves the life-totality and gives 'fulness and life to its contents; 'bad,' on the contrary, that which has more or less the tendency to dissolve or to limit the life-totality and its contents. Bad accordingly is the single moment, the separate impulse in its revolutionary isolation from the rest of life. . . ." (P. 29.)

"The Bad, therefore, is egotism in its various degrees and various forms. And the verdict about it will be the severer the more conscious this egotism is."

Utilitarianism as a rule has been hedonistic. Utilitarians have proposed as the criterion of an ethical valuation the consequences of an act ; if the consequences give more pleasure than pain, it is said to be good ; if they are attended with more pain than pleasure, it is said to be bad. In the above quoted definitions by Prof. Höffding there is no trace of hedonism, and I should consider an ethical system based upon these definitions as being in strong opposition to hedonism. But Prof. Höffding appears to have been so strongly biased by the influence of hedonistic utilitarianism, that he introduces again its fundamental idea, which identifies the good with the pleasurable. Although he objects to employing the terms "utility" and "happiness," "because they are liable to lead to misunderstandings and have indeed done so"; although he declares that "momentary feelings of pleasure and pain are no sure criterion for the total state" (p. 37); although for such reasons he proposes the word welfare, saying, "by the word 'welfare' I think of everything which serves to satisfy the wants of human nature in its whole entirety": still Prof. Höffding again returns to hedonism by limiting the idea "welfare" to the hedonistic conception of goodness. He defines welfare as "a continuous state of pleasurable feelings." (P. 98.)

Thus we are presented with two definitions of what constitutes the criterion of an ethical valuation : (1) that which promotes the life-totality, and (2) that which produces a continuous state of pleasurable feeling.

These two definitions are in many respects harmonious, but on the other hand they may come into conflict ; and if they come into conflict, which of the two is to be sacrificed ? Supposing that a contemplation of the evolution of organised life

should teach us that the development of a "life-totality" is not at all a pleasurable process; that on the contrary it is attended with excessive and innumerable pains. Inorganic nature so far as we can judge is free from pain. The isolated atom, we may assume, exists in a state of indifference. Supposing now that pain could be proved to increase, the higher we rise in the development of a life-totality; supposing that the growth of a life-totality had to be bought with pain, what would be the consequence? I will not here enter into the subject, but I may mention that this supposition is not at all without foundation. Assuming that it were so, would not, in such a case, the good be as Schopenhauer, Hartmann, and Mainländer propose, that which destroys the life-totality of consciousness and with it the whole world of civilised humanity, built up of the innumerable consciousnesses of individuals?

Professor Höffding has seen this difficulty, which arises from a conflict of the two criteria of ethical valuation (1) the hedonistic principle and (2) the principle of progress, i. e., the constant evolution of a higher life-totality. He says:

"John Stuart Mill has declared that it is better to be a dissatisfied man than a satisfied pig, a dissatisfied Socrates than a satisfied fool. He bases this assertion upon the fact that even if the pig and the fool were of a contrary mind, their opinion would have to be rejected, since they possess no knowledge of the higher point of view from which man and Socrates consider life, whereas man knows the needs of the pig and Socrates fathoms the fool. We must be regulated by the judgment of those that know the two kinds of needs in question and that are consequently able to institute an estimation of the value of the same.

"But I feel obliged to put in a word for the pig and the fool. The difficulty is greater than Mill imagines. Man, it is true, knows all the wants of the pig, and it would not be difficult for a Socrates to comprehend those of the fool. But man does not have the wants of the pig, nor Socrates those of the fool, as his *sole and only dominant* wants. And yet this is the very circumstance that determines the matter. Man cannot transform himself into a pig without ceasing to be a man, and a Socrates will hardly be able so to identify himself with a fool as to lose completely his Socratic wants. If, now, the pig can attain the *complete* satisfaction of all *his* wants, is not his happiness greater than that of man whose desires and whose longings are never wholly satisfied? And the fool, who does not nourish many thoughts and makes no great demands upon life, is he not happier than Socrates who spends his whole life in striving to know himself and to stimulate others, only finally to declare that death is really preferable to life?"

Professor Höffding's solution of the difficulty is summed up in the following paragraph:

"Welfare is an illusion if we understand by it a passive condition of things, created once for all. It must consist in *action*, work, development. Rest can only mean a termination for the time being, the attainment of a new level, upon which it is possible for a new course of development to proceed."

Thus it appears that Professor Höffding decides in favor of the second prin-

ciple. The evolution of the life-totality is considered higher than a continuous state of pleasurable feeling. Nevertheless Professor Höffding adds :

"On that account, however, we are not obliged to retract our first definition of "welfare as that of a continuous state of pleasurable feeling. That which must be "rejected is only the notion of a passive state."

Truly, as Professor Höffding says, "the difficulty is greater than Mr. Mill imagined." The difficulty is great enough to undermine the whole basis upon which welfare is defined as "a state of continuous pleasurable feeling." If, as Professor Höffding declares, welfare is to be interpreted as activity, work, development; if this kind of active welfare is the greatest good, whatever admixture of pain and whatever absence of pleasurable feeling it may have; if the greatest amount of a state of continuous pleasurable feeling is not welfare in an ethical sense, what becomes of the utilitarian definition of welfare as pleasurable feeling? If, however, welfare is "the state of a continuous pleasurable feeling," how can we declare that the life of a pessimistic philosopher is preferable to that of a joyful fool?

Must not the ultimate reason of this conflict be sought in Professor Höffding's statement that—

"The proposition of a purpose presupposes in the subject which makes the proposition feelings of pleasure and displeasure." (P. 30.)

Should we not rather say that the proposition of a purpose presupposes an expression of *will* in the subject which makes the proposition? Wherever there is will, there is also approval and disapproval, but approval is not always pleasurable and disapproval is not always attended with displeasure. Does it not often happen that we cannot help disapproving of things which please us?

We have mainly limited our review to some topics of the first division entitled "The Conditions of Ethics," because we have regarded them as most important in a representation of the ethical principles. The doubts we have raised as to the consistency of the author are less noticeable in the remaining chapters, which contain an unusual store of ideas presented with great lucidity. The doctrine of the freedom of will is excellently treated (chap. v.). Social ethics, family life, marriage, the position of woman, and the education of children are separately and exhaustively discussed, and there is no chapter which even if we cannot always give assent to the author's views, does not richly repay a careful perusal.

P. C.

KURZGEFASSTE LOGIK UND PSYCHOLOGIE. By *Dr. K. Kroman*. Translated from the second edition of the Original by F. Bendixen. Leipsic: O. R. Reisland.

Dr. Kroman is professor of philosophy at the University of Copenhagen. He has sought to present in this book of three hundred and eighty nine pages the elements of Logic and Psychology. The work was principally intended for the use of the general reader and the beginner, although its author hopes it will not